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Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 4, 34(c), and 35(c), Thompson Creek Mining
Company files this reply to the response brief filed by the Idaho Department of Water Resources
and its Director. This relates to Thompson Creek's challenge to the Director's creation of Water
District No. 170 ("WDl 70") in the Upper Salmon River Basin. Thompson Creek brings this
challenge pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (the "Idaho AP A").

I.
THE DIRECTOR'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 42-604
VIOLATES THE VERY RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
THAT HE CITES IN HIS RESPONSE BRIEF
Fundamentally, this case turns on the proper construction ofldaho Code
Section 42-604. In his response brief, the Director robotically recites some of the general rules
of statutory construction that have been recognized by this Court. (Respondent's Br., pp. 7, 10.)
However, as this reply brief will explain more fully, the construction of Section 42-604 advanced
by the Director plainly violates those rules.
The Director argues that he is mandated by the first paragraph of Section 42-604
to create a water district after a basin has been adjudicated in the SRBA. (Respondent's Br.,
pp. 9-10.) Fundamentally, this argument is illogical considering that the Department went
through the procedural steps of publishing notice, holding a public hearing, creating an
administrative record, and issuing an order. If the Director was statutorily mandated. to create
WD 170 at the outset of these steps, then the subsequent administrative proceedings were a
colossal waste of the Department's resources and, ultimately, of taxpayer dollars. Such a result
belies logic and cannot reflect the intent of the Idaho Legislature---'a critical consideration in any
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statutory construction as the Director notes. (Respondent's Br., p. 7.) See Dyet v. McKinley, 139
Idaho 526, 528, 81 P.3d 1236, 1238 (2003) ("Ifit is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute,
the Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the
language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the.
statute").
The Director's suggested construction also ignores the plain, everyday meaning of
terms used in Section 42-604. In order to agree with the Director that the first paragraph of
Section 42-604 mandates his creation ofWDI 70, one must accept the proposition that the word
"divide" has the same meaning as the word "create." This belies the everyday definitions of
those terms which, of course, is also a critical consideration in any statutory construction. See
Tonahill v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 131 Idaho 737,740,963 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1998)

("[T]his Court will give ordinary words their ordinary meaning unless a contrary purpose is
clearly indicated").
The mandate in the first paragraph to "divide" the state into water districts relates
only to the establishment of boundaries. It does not relate to the actual creation of a water
district, with the organizational structure, features, and attributes established by the other water
district statutes in Chapter 6 of Title 42. Only paragraph 2-not paragraph I-provides the
Director with the authority to "create" a water district. That authority is expressly conferred only
when the water district is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
Even without this plain distinction between the terms "divide" and "create," the
Director's construction of Section 42-604 ignores the remainder of the very sentence that he
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relies upon for his claimed mandate. Of course, as the Director recognizes, the courts should not
construe a statute in a manner that would render some language superfluous. (Respondent's Br.,
p. 7.) See Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794,803, 727 P.2d 1222, 1231 (1986) ("[W]hen
interpreting a statute, every effort should be made to give meaning to each word so as to not
render any word superfluous or without meaning").
The first sentence of Section 42-604 does not simply state that the Director "shall
divide the state into water districts," and end there. Instead, it states that the Director "shall
divide the state into water districts in such manner that each public stream and tributaries, or
independent source of water supply, shall constitute a water district: provided . ... "

LC. § 42-604 (emphasis added).
In other words, the first sentence of Section 42-604 acts as a restriction upon the
Director's creation of water districts by specifying some fundamental geographic requirements
that a water district must satisfy. The first paragraph of Section 42-604 is not a mandate or grant
of authority to create water districts. Again, that authority derives from the second paragraph of
Section 42-604.
This reply brief will discuss some of these issues of statutory construction in more
detail. However, before getting into the detailed textual analysis of Section 42-604, it is
important to understand the Director's construction of Section 42-604 as a general matter, and
how it violates the very principles of statutory construction that he references in his response
brief.
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II.

THE DIRECTOR MISREADS IDAHO CODE SECTION 42-604
TO MANDATE THE CREATION OF WATER DISTRICTS
In its initial brief, Thompson Creek argues that in order to legally create a water
district, the Director must find, based upon the plain language of the second paragraph of Idaho
Code Section 42-604, that a new water district is "required in order to properly administer uses
of the water resource." (Appellant's Br., pp. 30-33 (emphasis added).) The Director responds by
arguing that he was mandated by paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 to create WD 170 and that he
lacked any discretion to determine whether WDl 70 was "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource" pursuant to paragraph 2 of that statute. (Respondent's Br.,
pp. 6-10.) By making this argument, the Director attempts to read out of the statute the
requirement that a new water district be "required" for water administration purposes. This
would unnecessarily render several portions of Section 42-604 meaningless.
This is an issue of the proper construction of Section 42-604. In this regard, it is
important to note that this Court has free review over the construction and interpretation of
statutes, even when such statutes relate to an agency's area of expertise. See, e.g., Hayden Lake
Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005).

A.

Paragraph 1 Imposes Restrictions Upon The Establishment Of Water
District Boundaries; Paragraph 2 Provides The Authority To Actually
Create Water Districts
The Director relies upon multiple Idaho cases which state that the Court should

construe a statute "as a whole," rather than "separating one provision from another."
(Respondent's Br., p. 7.) Such an emphasis on that canon of statutory construction is especially
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noteworthy because the Director's construction of 42-604 violates the cited principle. Again, the
Director argues that paragraph I mandates the creation of water districts and that the "required"
standard in paragraph 2 does not apply to the creation ofWDl 70. (Respondent's Br., pp. 6-9.)
The necessary implication of such a construction is that paragraph I and paragraph 2 are
essentially separate provisions. In other words, it is the Director who is "separating one
provision from another," not Thompson Creek.
In order to truly read 42-604 "as a whole," this Court should read paragraph 2 as
describing the specific standards and procedures that apply to the creation of any water district.
A critical distinction between paragraphs I and 2 that the Director does not address is this:
paragraph I, by its specific terms, only requires the Director to "divide the state into water
districts in such manner that each public stream and tributaries, or independent source of water
supply, shall constitute a water district .... " LC. § 42-604, ,r I (emphasis added). The term
"create" does not appear anywhere in paragraph I. Id. That term does not appear in the text of
Section 42-604 until paragraph 2, which states that "[t]he director may create ... a water
district ... if such action is required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
LC. § 42-604,

,r 2.
Ordinary words should be given their ordinary meaning. Tonahill v. LeGrand

Johnson Const. Co., 131 Idaho 737,740,963 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1998). Here, to "create"means
"to cause to come into being, as something unique." WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 319
(Random House 1996). On the other hand, "divide" means "to separate into parts, groups, [or]
sections" or "to separate or part from something else." Id. at 392. In light of the Director's
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position that paragraph 1 mandated the creation ofWDl 70, the distinction between the use of the
terms "create" and "divide" is noteworthy. This distinction supports the conclusion that the
focus of paragraph 1 is drawing boundaries, and that it is paragraph 2 that actually provides the
authority to create water districts as entities, subject to the other enumerated restrictions.
Also noteworthy is the fact that Section 42-604 repeatedly uses the term "create"
(or some derivation thereof) as it sets forth the procedural due process protections associated
with water districts and the administrative function of such districts. See LC. § 42-604, ,r 2
("[t]he director may create, revise the boundaries of, or abolish a water district ... ") (emphasis
added); LC. § 42-604, ,r 3 ("[b Jefore entering an order creating, modifying, or abolishing a
district ... ") (emphasis added); LC.§ 42-604, ,r 4 ("[e]ach water district created hereunder ... ")
( emphasis added). Idaho Code Section 42-602 also uses the word "create" when it refers
to 42-604. See LC. § 42-602 ("[ d]istribution of water within water districts created pursuant to
section 42-604, Idaho Code ... ") (emphasis added).
Notably, the legislature did not use the word "create" in paragraph I of 42-604.
That was certainly not oversight and, in the absence of such language, it is patently absurd to
suggest that paragraph 1 amounts to a mandate or affirmative grant of absolute and unyielding
authority to "create" a water district. The overall purpose of the statute, when read in its entirety,
is to govern the "creation" of a water district. Each paragraph, including paragraph 1, serves the
entirety of the statute by providing limitations on the authority of the Director to so create. That
the Director must separate the state into water districts in a particular manner does not mean that
he must call them into being.
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Simply put, paragraph 1 does not mandate the creation of water districts, as the
Director maintains (Respondent's Br., pp. 8-9) because it simply contains no references to
actually creating water districts. What it does do is mandate that the Director "divide the state
into water districts in such manner," i.e., to establish the boundaries of potential future water
districts based upon the hydrogeology of the various basins and sub-basins within the state, i.e.,
"each public stream and tributaries, or independent source of water supply .... "
I.C. § 42-604, ,I 1.
This construction of Section 42-604 is supported by the remainder of paragraph 1,
which provides additional detail and restrictions regarding how the Director must establish those
boundaries. This provision places additional restrictions upon the Director if a water district is
"required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." If the Director does
"create" a water district after following the procedures and requirements ofparagraph 2, it must
be a water district in which the boundaries comply with paragraph 1. 1 I.C. § 42-604, ,r 1. See

Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264,267, 92 P.3d 514,517 (2004) (holding that a subsequent
provision in a statute modifies a previous provision, to the extent that the two provisions are
inconsistent).
This is the only construction of Section 42-604 that does not "separat[e] one
provision from another" and that does not render portions of the statute "meaningless" or "mere

1

Importantly, paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 specifies four additional limitations upon
the manner in which the Director "shall divide" the state into water districts. Each limitation
upon executive power is preceded by "provided."
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surplusage." To the contrary, this construction considers Section 42-604 "as a whole" and leaves
all of its language intact. It is, therefore, the preferred construction of that statute pursuant to the
judicial opinions cited by the Director and Thompson Creek which describe the rules and
standards of statutory construction.

B.

The Director's Reading Of Section 42-604 Would Render Many Of Its
Provisions Superfluous
In his response brief, the Director cites several cases that describe general rules of

judicial statutory construction. (Respondent's Br., p. 7.) Unfortunately, he fails to describe one
of the most important rules of statutory construction: that the Court should not read a statute in
such a manner that it would render provisions of the statute "mere surplusage." Sweitzer v.

Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P .2d 27, 31 ( 1990). In other words, "when interpreting a statute,
every effort should be made to give meaning to each word so as to not render any word
superfluous or without meaning." Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 803, 727 P.2d 1222, 1231
(1986) (citations omitted). This is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that has
"enjoy[ ed] long standing acceptance" in the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. Furthermore, "[i]t is also
a general rule of statutory construction that the specific statute prevails, modifying the general
statute." Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 808, 814, 784 P.2d 392,398 (1987).
Again, the Director argues that paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 required him to
create WDl 70, regardless of whether the record demonstrates that it is "required" for water
administration purposes, pursuant to paragraph 2 of that statute. (Respondent's Br., pp. 6-10.)
Such an interpretation would unnecessarily render several of its provisions meaningless.
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1.

The Authority To Create Water Districts Pursuant To Paragraph 2
Would Be Superfluous

First, if paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 indeed requires the Director to "create"
water districts, then there would be no purpose to the portion of paragraph 2 that specifically
grants power to the Director to create water districts only when doing so is "required in order to
properly administer uses of the water resource." · Simply put, there would be no reason for the
Legislature to grant the Director limited power to create water districts in one provision, yet
mandate creation of them in another provision.
The Director attempts to address this inconsistency with the following
explanation:
The Idaho Legislature has already made a determination by statute
that when these preconditions are satisfied, the Director shall
create a water district . . . . What the Director does have under the
statute is the discretion to determine how the water district used
for the administration of the adjudicated rights wil! be structured.
For example, whether a new district will be created, whether the
boundaries of an existing district will be revised, whether an
existing district will be abolished, or whether two or more water
districts will be combined as "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource."
(Respondent's Br., p. 9 (emphasis added).)
The emphasized portions of the above passage make no sense. The Director
begins by stating that paragraph I requires him to create WDI 70. He then attempts to avoid
rendering paragraph 2 "mere surplusage" by stating that paragraph 2 provides the Director with
"discretion to determine how the water district ... will be structured." Confusingly, however, he
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then includes the "creation" of the water district as one of the items for which the Director has
discretion.
This is a tortured construction of Section 42-604. Simply put, if paragraph 1
mandates the creation of water districts, then the "creation" provision in paragraph 2 is
meaningless. A more reasonable construction is that paragraph 2 provides more detail regarding
the standards and procedures that apply any time a new water district is created, as this Reply
will explain more fully below.

2.

The Authority To Abolish Water Districts Pursuant To Paragraph 2
Would Be Superfluous

Similarly, it is notable that paragraph 2 of Section 42-604 grants the Director the
executive power to "abolish" water districts. Under the interpretation of Section 42-604
suggested by the Director, if the Director did in fact abolish a water district, then this would run
afoul of the claimed mandate in paragraph I to "create" water districts throughout the entire state
of Idaho. The Director does not explain how to reconcile those two provisions, nor is there any
logical or reasonable way to do so.

3.

The Procedural Requirements In Paragraphs 2 And 3 Would Be
Superfluous

The Director's suggested interpretation of Section 42-604 gives rise to another
irreconcilable statutory inconsistency. Paragraph 2 of the statute specifies that when the Director
creates a water district, he must issue an order to that effect and provide affected water users with
copies of that order. LC. § 42-604, '1) 2. It also specifies that his decision to create a water
district is subject to judicial review pursuant to Section 42-l 701A. Id.
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Under the Director's construction of Section 42-604, however, none of these
requirements would apply to a water district created pursuant to the "mandate" of paragraph 1.
Again, the Director argues that the "required" standard of paragraph 2 does not apply to his
creation ofWDl 70 because he was mandated by paragraph 1 to create the district.
(Respondent's Br., pp. 6-9.) If that is indeed the proper construction of 42-604, then the Director
has failed to explain why any of the other requirements in paragraph 2 would apply to the
creation ofWDl 70, since he essentially reads paragraphs 1 and 2 as separate bases for creating a
water district. Paragraph 1 does not contain any references to any of the procedures required by
paragraph 2. I. C. § 42-604, ,r 1.
The same argument can be made with respect to paragraph 3 of Section 42-604.
Similar to paragraph 2, paragraph 3 describes the notice and hearing requirements that apply
when the Director creates, modifies, or abolishes a water district. I.C. § 42-604, ,r 3. As such, it
is a logical extension of paragraph 2. If paragraph 1 indeed mandates the creation of water
districts separately from paragraph 2, then it is necessarily separate from paragraph 3 as well.
Under this construction, none of the procedural requirements of paragraph 3 would apply, either.
However, here the Director followed all of the procedures described by
paragraphs 2 and 3: he issued a notice of the proceeding (R., Vol. 3, pp. 467-69), he accepted
written testimony (R., Vol. 3, pp. 485-87, 488-89; Vol. 4, pp. 638-44), he held a hearing
(R., Vol. 2, pp. 348-61), he issued two orders (R., Vol. 3, pp. 494-507, 565-580), he served those
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orders upon affected water users (R., Vol. 3, pp. 508-35, 581-606), and he acquiesced to judicial
review of that order by his participation in this proceeding. 2

If the Director truly believes that paragraph 1 mandates creation of water districts
and he created WD 170 pursuant to that mandate, rather than the discretionary provisions of
paragraph 2, then there was no rational basis for going through all of these procedures. Again,
the Director asserts that the "required" standard of paragraph 2 is inapplicable to his creation of
WDl 70. (Respondent's Br., pp. 6-9.) If that is the case, then he has failed to explain why any of
the other procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3-procedures which he specifically followed-would
apply to that action.

C.

The Only Standard Thompson Creek Suggests Is The "Required" Standard
Set Out In The Plain Language Of The Statute
The Director repeatedly states that Thompson Creek urges this Court to adopt a

new standard under Section 42-604 for the creation of water districts by noting Thompson
Creek's use of terminology like "demonstrated imperative" and "absolute necessity."
(Respondent's Br., pp. 6, 16, 26.) He suggests that the adoption of a new standard is the "theme"
of Thompson Creek's argument. (Respondent's Br., p. 6, n. 3.)
The repeated invocation and dismissal of that language in the Director's response
brief is obfuscation. The only standard Thompson Creek urges this Court to follow is the
statutory "required" standard in Section 42-604. The "required" standard for the creation of a
water district is more than just "Thompson Creek's suggested legal standard." (Respondent's
2

Despite having taken these actions, the Director also committed a variety of procedural
errors, as Thompson Creek explains in its initial brief. (Appellant's Br., pp. 12-38, 41-43.)
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Br., p. 16.) It is the standard established by the Legislature in the plain language of the statute.
Regardless of the definition of"required," the Director failed to follow the defined standard.
Considering the Director's confusion about what, if anything, "required" means, it
is noteworthy that the Director has failed to enact regulations interpreting Section 42-604.
Significantly, he also did not suggest an alternative definition of the "required" standard in his
response brief. Instead, he clings to the argument that paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 mandates
the creation ofWDl 70, a construction which belies the plain language and structure of that
statute.

D.

Section 42-604 Does Not Mandate The Creation Of Water Districts Simply
Because A Basin Has Been Adjudicated In The SRBA
Finally, in his argument that paragraph 1 of Section 42-604 mandates "creation"

ofWDl 70, the Director relies heavily upon Section 42-604's proviso that it "shall not apply to
streams or water supplies whose priorities of appropriation have not been adjudicated by the
courts having jurisdiction thereof." (Respondent's Br., pp. 9-10.) The Director essentially
argues that this reference to water right adjudications in Section 42-604 requires him to create a
water district once a basin has been adjudicated in the SRBA. (Respondent's Br., pp. 9-10.)
However, the language does not speak as an affirmative grant of executive power.
Instead, it is one of four separate restrictions upon the Director's power, granted by the
Legislature, to "create" a water district after the procedures and requirements of paragraph 2 are
satisfied. The Director's construction converts clear legislative restrictions upon governmental
power into the direct opposite: an expansion of executive power. Legislative directives are not
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so malleable. The Court should recognize the Director's contorted, misshapen construction for
what it is.
Additionally, the Director fails to appreciate that the reference to adjudications
was inserted into Section 42-604 (and its statutory predecessors) at a time when water rights
adjudications were of a much different character than the massive SRBA. This specific language
regarding water right adjudications was added by the Idaho Legislature to Section 42-604's
statutory predecessor in 1909. IDAHO SEss. LAWS 1909, p. 327, § 1 (codified at R.C. § 3274
(1909)). At that time in Idaho's history, water right adjudications were generally initiated on
sources of water where there was already a significant dispute over water rights. This makes
sense because, prior to the adoption of statutes specifically governing the initiation of water right
adjudications, such adjudications took the form of quiet title actions. See Frost v. Alturas Water

Co., 11 Idaho 294, 81 P. 996(1905)(adjudicatingwaterrightsintheBigWoodRiverbasin).
Quiet title actions inherently involve actual disputes over interests in real property. See

generally, 65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title§ I (2001).
For example, in the Idaho Supreme Court's 1905 Frost opinion dealing with a
water rights adjudication on the Big Wood River, the Court described why that adjudication was
initiated:
About 20 appropriators and users of the waters of the Malad or Big
Wood river commenced their action against about 700 other
appropriators and users of the waters of that stream, setting up the
respective rights and priorities of the plaintiffs, and alleging that
the defendants were hindering and obstructing the plaintiffs in
the exercise of their rights and several appropriations, and the
wrongful diversion by the defendants of the waters of said
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stream, to the damage, injury, and prejudice of the rights of the
plaintiffs ....

Frost, 11 Idaho at 297, 81 P. at 996 (emphasis added).
Similarly:
The contention of Mr. Frost is that all appropriators above him, on
either Big or Little Wood river (which means those streams with
all their tributaries), are taking water that belongs to him ....

Frost, 11 Idaho at 301, 81 P. at 998 (emphasis added).
When the reference to water right adjudications was added to the water district
statute, such adjudications involved actual disputes over water on discrete sources of water.
And, logically, the Idaho Legislature provided a means for regulating and administering water
diversions after an adjudication took place, through a water district. This makes sense: if there
were disputes over water prior to an adjudication, one can presume that there could be disputes
over water after the adjudication, and water districts provided a mechanism for minimizing such
disputes.
The SRBA and the situation in Basin 72 is much different. It is well-documented
that the SRBA was initiated primarily in response to Idaho Power's allegations that it was not
receiving sufficient water at its Swan Falls Dam facility on the Snake River. See In re Snake

River Basin Water System, 115 Idaho I, 2-3, 764 P.2d 78, 79-80 (1988); see also, Idaho Power
Co. v. State, 104 Idaho 575,661 P.2d 741 (1983). Basin 72 is in the upper reaches of the Salmon
River, which joins the Snake River many miles downstream of Swan Falls Dam. Simply put,
there is no way that water use in Basin 72 and WDI 70 could possibly affect flows at Swan Falls
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Dam, nor could water users in Basin 72 or WDl 70 initiate a delivery call against diversions on
the Snake River.
In short, the SRBA-which covers nearly 90% of the geographic area of the state
ofldaho-was imposed on many areas like Basin 72 where there have been relatively few
disputes over water use. This explains why, as Thompson Creek has repeatedly noted, there is
no evidence in the record of this case of water delivery calls within Basin 72 which would
support a finding that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water
resource," as Section 42-604 mandates.
The reference to water right adjudications in Section 42-604 must be considered
in the context of the character of such adjudications in the early 1900s, when that reference was
adopted by the Legislature. The SRBA is a much different type of water right adjudication than
the drafters of Section 42-604's statutory predecessors could have contemplated. Therefore, the
creation of water districts after a basin has been adjudicated in the SRBA should not be
inevitable, as the Department seems to argue. To the contrary, after a basin has been
adjudicated, a water district should be created only if it is "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource," as mandated by the specific language of Section 42-604.

III.
THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE DEPARTMENT IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CREATION OF WDl 70

In its brief, Thompson Creek argues that there is not "substantial evidence on the
record as a whole" supporting the Director's creation ofWD! 70, as required by the Idaho APA
in Section 67-5279(3)(e). (Appellant's Br., pp. 23-39.) When that provision is read in
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conjunction with Section 42-604, Thompson Creek believes that "substantial evidence" must
demonstrate that WDI 70 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
LC.§§ 42-604, 67-5279(3)(e). The Director's response to this straightforward interpretation of
the two statutes is two-fold. First, the Director argues that the "required" standard of
Section 42-604 does not apply. (Respondent's Br., pp. 5-10.) Thompson Creek has already
addressed that argument in the preceding section of this Reply.
The Director's second argument amounts to a call for this Court to defer to
agency findings. (Respondent's Br., pp. 27-28.) He notes that when a court reviews an agency
decision under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, "[t]he mere presence of conflicting
evidence is not actionable." (Respondent's Br., p. 28.) However, this position presumes the
existence of"substantial evidence on the record as a whole" supporting the creation ofWDl 70.
To support his position that substantial evidence exists, the Director relies upon three items:
(1) the SRBA Court's order granting interim administration; (2) Conclusion of Law 8 in the
WDJ 70 Order; and (3) and a previous affidavit of Department employee Tim Luke.
(Respondent's Br., pp. 17-20.) But, as this section of the Reply explains, the evidence relied
upon by the Director consists of factual statements that are either not relevant or not supported
by evidence in the record.

A.

Interim Administration Is Not Evidence That A Water District Is
"Required"
As Thompson Creek explains in its initial brief, the fact that interim

administration had been established in Basins 7 ! and 72 is not evidence that a water district is
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"required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource," as required by
Section 42-604. (Appellant's Br., pp. 27-28.) The interim administration statute specifically
states, "[a]fter entry of the district court's order for interim administration, the director may form
a water district pursuant to chapter 6, title 42, Idaho Code." I.C. § 42-1417(4) (emphasis added).
Critically, the statute states the Director "may"-not "shall"-form a water
district after water rights have been adjudicated. Also, as Thompson Creek explained in its
initial brief, Section 42-1417 specifically incorporates Section 42-604 and its "required" standard
because it states "the director may form a water district pursuant to chapter 6, title 42, Idaho

Code." LC.§ 42-1417(4) (emphasis added).
Certainly, interim administration is relevant to the creation of a water district
because it establishes that a water district "may" be created after an order of interim
administration exists. However, interim administration does not constitute evidence that a water
district is actually "required" for water administration purposes. Accordingly, the Director's
reliance upon the order for interim administration is misplaced.

B.

The WDl 70 Order Provisions Relied Upon By The Department Are Either
Not Relevant Or Are Based On Evidence That Is Not In The Record
To support his argument that the creation ofWDl 70 is supported by substantial

evidence on the record, the Director also relies upon Conclusion of Law 8 from the WDl 70
Order. (Respondent's Br., p. 19.) That Conclusion states:
8.
Given that: (1) there are no water districts in Basin 71;
(2) the administration of surface water rights in the existing water
districts in Basin 72 is often inconsistent; (3) none of the existing
water districts in Basin 72 administer surface water rights outside
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of the irrigation season for those rights or during the irrigation
season when the surface water sources are not in regulation; and
(4) none of the existing water districts in Basin 72 regulate
diversions from ground water; the Director concludes that there
should be one water district created that encompasses all of the
water rights within the Upper Salmon River Basin, and that the
existing surface water districts in Basin 72 should be designated as
subdistricts, in order to provide consistent and effective
administration of water rights from both surface water sources and
ground water sources year-round throughout the Upper Salmon
River Basin.
(R., Vol. 3, p. 572; Respondent's Br., p. 19.)
The statements in Conclusion of Law 8 are conclusory statements of fact that are
not supported by actual fact evidence in the record. The only statement that would potentially
support the conclusion that WDl 70 is "required" for water administration purposes is number 2:
"the administration of surface water rights in the existing water districts in Basin 72 is often
inconsistent." (R., Vol. 3, p. 572 (emphasis added).)
However, by its terms, this statement only describes conditions within the three
small, pre-existing water districts in Basin 72. The conclusion does not describe conditions in
the majority of the areas that lie within Basin 72, and it does not even purport to describe
conditions within Basin 71. The statement logically suggests the existing water districts need to
be improved, not that an entirely new-and much larger-water district should be created.
In addition, as Thompson Creek has explained, such a factual statement needs to
either be supported by substantial evidence in the record, or it needs to be officially noticed by
the Director pursuant to the requirements of Sections 67-5249(2)(c) and 67-5251(4) of the Idaho
Code. (Appellant's. Br., pp. 28-30.) The Director has not demonstrated that either of these
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conditions have been met. In response to Thompson Creek's argument on this issue, the Director
argues, "it must be recognized that the agency proceeding for the creation of a water district is
not a typical contested case proceeding. The Director.. .is not adjudicating contested factual and
legal issues between competing parties .... " (Respondent's Br., p. 26.) There is no support in
the Idaho AP A for the proposition that the Director is somehow relieved of his duties to make
decisions based upon "substantial evidence in the record," simply because the nature of the
proceeding is as a public hearing, rather than a contested case between competing parties.
The remaining three factual statements in Conclusion of Law 8 provide no
evidence that WDI 70 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
As this Court has held, "[ s]ubstantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Curtis v. M H King Co., 142 Idaho
383, 385, 128 P.3d 920,922 (2005) (citations omitted). The statements relied upon by the
Director simply establish that there currently are no water districts in Basin 71 and that the water
districts in Basin 72 do not administer groundwater rights and do not operate year-round. While
these statements may be true, they do not establish an actual need for a water district, because
they do not establish that senior water rights are being injured by junior water rights.
Accordingly, those statements are not "relevant evidence" supporting the conclusion that a water
district is required. More evidence than this is needed to demonstrate that WDl 70 is "required in
order to properly administer uses of the water resource."

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 20

C!lent:1050450.4

C.

The Luke Affidavit Does Not Establish That WDl 70 Is "Required"
The Director also relies upon the following language from the affidavit of

Department employee Timothy J. Luke to support the argument that the creation of WDl 70 is
supported by substantial evidence on the record:
The specific reasons for creation or enlargement of water districts
in Basin 71 and 72 are:
•

•

•

•

•

Existing water districts in these basins are iimited to surface water
sources and do not include ground water sources. Additionally,
some surface water sources in these basins may not be included in
any water district.
All of the water rights claimed in Basins 71 and 72 have been
reported or partially decreed in the SRBA as required under I.C.
§ 42-1417.
Some areas of the basins are in either water measurement districts
or existing wi1:ter districts, or no district at all. Certain rights and
sources (primarily ground water) within water districts have not
been subject to administration or regulation by the water district,
· and measurement districts are limited to measurement and
reporting only, not regulation or enforcement of rights.
The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters with
the ability to administer water rights in accordance with the prior
appropriation doctrine as established by Idaho law.
The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters the
means to protect senior water rights.

(Respondent's Br., pp. 19-20; R., Vol. 2, p.383.)
Unfortunately for the Director, none of the quoted statements from the Luke
Affidavit actually demonstrate a need for the creation of WDl 70. In other words, as with
Conclusion of Law 8, those statements do not demonstrate that senior water rights are
consistently being injured such that a water district is· necessary to protect those rights. Again,
-this is not "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support [the] conclusion"
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that a water district is required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource. See

Curtis, 142 Idaho at 385, 128 P.3d at 922.
The putpose of the Luke Affidavit was to support the Department's
commencement of interim administration in Basins 71 and 72. (R., Vol. 2, p. 381.) As
Thompson Creek explained in its initial brief, the commencement of interim administration is
subject to less stringent legal standards than is the creation of a water district. (Appellant's Br.,
p. 27.) While the Luke Affidavit may have been sufficient to support interim administration, it
does not provide any evidence that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of
the water resource," as Section 42-604 mandates.
To the contrary, the quoted passage from the Luke Affidavit actually highlights
the lack of evidence in the record. It references the fact that some areas within Basins 71 and 72
are in "water measurement districts." (Respondent's Br., p. 20; R., Vol. 2, p. 383.) Generally
speaking, the Director can create a water measurement district in order to measure, catalog, and
document water supplies and diversions within the district. LC.§§ 42-705, 42-706, and 42-709.
This begs the question: If the Department has legal authority to measure water
supplies and diversions, and since areas within Basins 71 and 72 are within water measurement
districts, then why is there no water measurement data in the record? Similarly, the record
contains no evidence of any requests from water users within Basins 71 and 72 for increased
water right administration or any documentation of water delivery calls that have been initiated
in those basins. This is the type of information that the Director could rely upon to demonstrate
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that creation ofWDI 70 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
However, no such evidence appears in the record.
Significantly, in the WD 170 Order, the Director does not even bother to describe
the "evidence" that is contained in the Luke Affidavit. At most, there are passing references to
the affidavit in Finding of Fact 1 and Conclusion of Law 15. (R., VoL 3, pp. 565-66, 574.)
There is certainly no discussion of how that Affidavit supports the conclusion that WDl 70 is
"required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." Given that the Director is
so heavily relying upon the Luke Affidavit in his response brief as factual support for the
creation of WD 170, one would expect him to have discussed it prominently in the order creating
WDl 70. He did not.

IV.
THE DIRECTOR'S ARGUMENTS REJECTING THOMPSON
CREEK'S "BIASED DECISION-MAKER" CLAIM ARE MISPLACED
In its initial brief, Thompson Creek argues that the Director was a biased
decision-maker because he believed the W &SR Agreement required him to create WD 170,
regardless of what the evidence in the record showed. (Appellant's Br., pp. 19-22.) This
conclusion is based in part upon multiple statements contained in the administrative record in
which Department personnel specifically stated that the Department "must" establish WD 170 in
order to "comply" with the W&SR Agreement. (Appellant's Br., pp. 19-20.) Thompson Creek
argues that, pursuant to Idaho case law guaranteeing an impartial decision-maker, this
decision-maker bias is a Due Process violation. (Appellant's Br., pp. 17-22.) In his response
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brief, the Director attempts to refute Thompson Creek's decision-maker bias argument with a
number of counter-arguments, each of which is addressed below.

A.

Thompson Creek Did Not Waive This Argument By Not Attempting To
Disqualify The Director Pursuant To Section 67-5252
The Director argues that Thompson Creek has waived its decision-maker bias

argument by not attempting to disqualify the Director as the presiding officer of the hearing
pursuant to Section 67-5252. (Respondent's Br., p. 15.) However, Section 67-5252 simply
provides parties with the ability to disqualify presiding officers under certain circumstances. It
does not state that such an argument is forever "waived" if a party does not actually file a motion
for disqualification. Although the Director does not specifically mention it, perhaps his
argument is based upon Section 67-5252(2), which states that "[a]ny party may petition for the
disqualification of a person serving or designated to serve as presiding officer ... within
fourteen (14) days after receipt of notice indicating that the person will preside at the contested
case; or ... promptly upon discovering facts establishing grounds for disqualification, whichever
is later."
That provision does not bar Thompson Creek's decision-maker bias claim.
Thompson Creek was not aware of the actual bias of the Director until it was able to review the
administrative record in its entirety, well after the Director had issued the WDl 70 Order. It
would be unreasonable to require Thompson Creek to attempt to disqualify the Director before it
was fully aware of the basis of its bias claim. The order creating WDI 70 had already been
issued when Thompson Creek reviewed the administrative record in its entirety, after it had been
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lodged by Department personnel. It was at that time that Thompson Creek discovered the extent
of the Director's reliance upon the W&SR Agreement, and it would have been pointless to
attempt to disqualify the Director as the presiding officer after-the-fact.
In addition, it is critical that Thompson Creek did argue to the Director in its
Written Comments of November 18, 2005, and its Petition for Reconsideration of
March 17, 2006, that the W&SR Agreement was an improper basis for forming WDl 70.
(R., Vol. 3, pp. 538-40; Vol. 4, pp. 640-42.) In fact, in response to this argument, the Director in
the WD I 70 Order specifically states that "Thompson Creek further argues that the Director has
no legally supportable basis for creation of the proposed water district because he cannot rely
upon the provisions of the . .. Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement . ... " (R., Vol. 3, p. 575
(emphasis added).)
Even though Thompson Creek did not specifically label its argument as
"decision-maker bias" at that time, its assertion that the W &SR Agreement was an improper
basis for forming WDl 70 sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal, because that is the basis of
its "bias" argument. Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700, 735 P.2d 1008, 1011
(1987) (refusing to bar a claim on appeal, even though it was not formally raised below, because
it was "implicitly before" the lower tribunal). Accordingly, Thompson Creek did not "waive"
this argument by not attempting to disqualify the Director as the presiding officer of the hearing.
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B.

The Director's Assertion That The Department Was Not A Party To The
W &SR Agreement Is Disingenuous And False

The Director also argues that he could not have thought that he was required by
the W&SR Agreement to create WDl 70 because he was not a party to that Agreement.
(Respondent's Br., pp. 13-17.) The Director goes so far as to characterize Thompson Creek's
focus upon the W &SR Agreement as "perplexing," because the W &SR Order so clearly states
that the Agreement is not binding upon anyone other than the "signatory parties." (Respondent's
Br., pp. 14-15.) Again, the references in the record to Department personnel stating that the
W&SR Agreement "requires" the creation ofWDl 70 are well-documented and uncontroverted
by the Director, so this position should not be so "perplexing" to the Director.
The Director's argument that he could not have thought he was required by the
W &SR Agreement to create WD 170 because the Agreement only bound "signatory parties" is
also disingenuous and ineffective for another reason. The W &SR Agreement was executed by
Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General for the State ofldaho, "for the State ofldaho, including the
Idaho Water Resources Board." (R., Vol. 4, p. 732.) The Attorney General is the attorney for all
state agencies, including the Department. LC.§ 67-1401. By executing the W&SR Agreement
on behalf of the State ofldaho, Wasden bound all of its agencies, including the Department.
Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329,332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004) (stating the general rules that

"[t]he relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency" and "[a]n agent may bind a
principal if the agent has actual authority").
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In this regard, it is cbnfounding that the Director specifically argues that, "IDWR
was not a signatory party [to the W &SR Agreement] and was not represented by a signatory
party." (Respondent's Br., p. 16 (emphasis added).) Given that the Agreement was signed by
Idaho's Attorney General on behalf of the State ofldaho, this is an unbelievable statement that
ignores the most basic, fundamental tenets of administrative law and the attorney-client and
principal-agent relationships.

It is also noteworthy that the Idaho Water Resources Board was specifically
designated as a signatory to the W&SR Agreement. (R., Vol. 4, p. 732.) Collectively, the
Board, the Director, and the Department are responsible for nearly all water resource planning,
management, and administration within the State of Idaho. See IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 7;
LC. §§ 42-1701, 42-1706, 42~1732, 42-1734. Speaking very generally, the Board is responsible
for high-level, long term water resource planning, while the Director and the Department are
responsible for the day-to-day administration of water rights. Given their relationship to the
Idaho Water Resource Board, the argument by the Director and the Department that they did not
feel that they were bound by the W &SR Agreement is unpersuasive.
The Director's argument is particularly weak in light of the multiple, specific
references in the W &SR Agreement to "IDWR." For example, the W &SR Agreement states
that, "The State [of Idaho], through the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") and
local water districts created and supervised by IDWR pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 42-604, et seq.,
shall distribute water to the federal reserved water rights set forth in this Stipulation .... "

(R., Vol. 4, p. 714.) It also states that, "IDWR will establish water districts as necessary to assist
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IDWR in the administration of water rights. The parties agree that, regardless of whether a water
district has been established for an area, IDWR will: A) collect and record diversion data;
B) enforce the water rights in priority; and C) curtail unauthorized or excessive diversions as
necessary." (R., Vol. 4, p. 714.) And, the W&SR Agreement states simply that, "IDWR will
establish a water district for the Upper Salmon River Basin." (R., Vol. 4, p. 715.)
To argue, in light of all of these specific references in the W&SR Agreement to
IDWR, that the Director did not feel he was bound by that Agreement because he was not a
"signatory party" implies that the Attorney General negotiated and executed that Agreement
without the input or knowledge of the Director. This is unreasonable. Moreover, it also implies
the Attorney General signed a major settlement agreement without first verifying that IDWR
would follow the terms of the agreement-a highly improbable proposition.
In order to support his position that the Director did not feel he was bound by the
W &SR Agreement, the Director also relies upon language in Conclusion of Law 20 of the
WDl 70 Order, which states generally that "[t]he Director relies on the authority provided by
Idaho Code§ 42~604 for creation of the proposed water district." (Respondent's Br., p. 17.)
That conclusory statement is not sufficient to establish that the Director was not relying upon the
W &SR Agreement. Simply put, saying it does not make it so. It certainly does not refute all of
the well-documented references in the record to the Department's belief that it was required by
the W&SR Agreement to create WDI 70. (Appellant's Br., pp. 19-22.) See also infra
Section IV.C.
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C.

The Director's Repeated References To Its Belief That The W&SR
Agreement Required Creation Of WDI 70 Demonstrate Bias
The Director acknowledges that the record contains numerous references to the

W &SR Agreement, but he maintains that such references do not show that he improperly relied
upon it in creating WDI 70, noting that the W&SR Agreement was relevant to the Director's
formation ofWD170. (Respondent's Br., p. 17.) It is noteworthy that the Director fails to
meaningfully address the numerous statements made by Department personnel demonstrating
their belief that the W &SR Agreement required the Director's fonnation of WDI 70. 3
As Thompson Creek has previously noted, among those statements are those of
Department employee Tim Luke and current Director, David Tuthill Jr., who presented slides at
the first WD 170 Steering Committee meeting stating that IDWR "must establish" WD 170.
(Appellant's Br., pp. 19-20.) Testimony of a meeting attendee confinned that Tim Luke and
Director Tuthill represented the formation of the district as a "necessity" and an "obligation."
(Appellant's Br., p. 20.)

It should also be noted that the agenda for the first WDl 70 Steering Committee
meeting distributed by Department personnel refers to the "Wild and Scenic Rivers Agreement"
and the "[r]equirements of Water District pursuant to [that] agreement." (R., Vol. 3, p. 425.)
Furthermore, the minutes from that meeting describe a presentation by Department personnel

3

Additionally, the unrecorded portion of the November 9, 2005 hearing in Challis,
where the Director explained the "factors he considered in proposing to establish the Upper
Salmon River Water District," also raises concerns on this issue.
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about the "Wild and Scenic Rivers Agreement" and how it "includes a provision for creation of
a water district in the Upper Salmon Basin." (R., Vol. 3, pp. 426,427 (emphasis added).)
In addition, the Director asserts in Conclusion of Law 16 of the WD 170 Order
that "[j]ustification for creation of the proposed district ... is provided in the Department's
Notice .... " (R., Vol. 3, pp. 565, 574.) However, this begs the question: If the purpose of the
hearing is to create a record upon which the decision is to be made, how can the notice of that
proceeding-which necessarily predates the hearing-provide any basis whatsoever for creating
the new district? Under Section 42-604, the purpose of the hearing is to determine if there is
justification for the creation of a new water district.
Similarly, the Notice speaks of the creation of the new water district as an
inevitability by its detailed description of the structure of the "proposed" water district. (R.,
Vol. 3, pp. 467, 468.) This directly contradicts the Notice's statement that the hearing "will
create a record upon which the Director will rely to determine whether formation of a water
district is appropriate, and ifso, how the district should be formed." (R., Vol. 3, p. 467.) This
last statement is disingenuous because, as the remainder of the Notice makes clear, the Director
had already detennined what the structure of the water district would be prior to the hearing on
which the decision is supposed to be based. (R., Vol. 3, p. 468.)
TI1ese examples further demonstrate that the Director, as specified by the Wild &
Scenic Rivers Agreement, had already decided to create WDl 70 prior to the hearing on the
matter. As Thompson Creek has argued, this rendered him a biased decision-maker, which is a
violation of Due Process.
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V.
THE DIRECTOR'S ARGUMENTS REJECTING
THOMPSON CREEK'S CLAIM THAT THE DIRECTOR FAILED
TO RECORD THE ENTIRE HEARING ARE MISPLACED
In its initial brief, Thompson Creek argues that the Director violated Due Process
and procedural requirements by not recording and transcribing the entire hearing regarding the
creation ofWDl 70. (Appellant's Br., pp. 12-15.) As Thompson Creek explained, the hearing
notice establishes that the hearing began at 7:00 p.m., but the transcript reflects that the Director
did not go on the record until 8:10 p.m. (Appellant's Br., p. 13; R., Vol. 3, p. 467; R., Vol. 2,
p. 350, LL. 7-8.)

A.

The Unrecorded Question And Answer Session Was Part Of The Hearing As
A Matter Of Law
The Director attempts in his response brief to re-write Thompson Creek's

argument on this issue. More specifically, the Director states that, "Thompson Creek asserts that
the Director violated the [Idaho APAJ because he conducted an informal question and answer

session with water users prior to going on the record .... " (Respondent's Br., p. 22 (emphasis
added).) This is not what Thompson Creek argues.
Rather, Thompson Creek believes that the question-and-answer period was part of
the hearing and therefore should have been recorded and transcribed. Again, the hearing notice
specifically states that the hearing was to begin at 7:00 p.m. (R,, Vol. 3, p. 467.), and
then-Director Dreher specifically stated that, "[t]his meeting began shortly after 7:00 p.m...."
(R., Vol. 2, p. 350, L. 8 (emphasis added).) The hearing, therefore, began at 7:00 p.m. as a

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 31

Client: 1050450.4

matter of law. The Director cannot change that simply by characterizing the unrecorded portion
of the hearing as "an informal question and answer session." (Respondent's Br., p. 22.)
Even if it was a question-and-answer session, it was still part of the hearing that
was required to be recorded and transcribed pursuant to Section 67-5242(3)(d) of the Idaho
Code. The fact that Director Dreher specifically referred to the question-and-answer portion as
part of"this meeting" demonstrates his belief that the question-and-answer portion was part of
the hearing. And, the Director has judicially admitted that the question-and-answer session
included a description of the "factors he considered in proposing to establish the Upper Salmon
River Water District and answering questions about the establishment of the district and how it
was envisioned to function." (Respondent's Br., pp. 2-3.)
B.

Thompson Creek W11s Not Awue Of This Deficiency Until It Had An
Opportunity To Review The Tr11nscript And Record In Their Entirety
The Director argues that this claim is barred because it is being raised for the first

time on appeal. (Respondent's Br., pp. 22-23.) To support his argument, the Director notes that
Thompson Creek submitted Written Comments, a Petition for Reconsideration, and an objection
to the record that did not raise that issue. (Respondent's Br., pp. 22-23.) However, Thompson
Creek was not aware of this procedural deficiency at the time it submitted any of those
documents. It was only upon a detailed review of the transcript and record together during the
briefing of this matter that it became aware of this procedural deficiency.
While Thompson Creek understands that issues generally cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, that rule applies to "contested cases in administrative settings as well as
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proceedings before the courts." Knight v. Dep 't ofIns., 124 Idaho 645, 649, 862 P.2d 377, 341
(Idaho App. 1993). The WDl 70 hearing was not a judicial proceeding and as the Director notes,
it was "not a typical contested case proceeding" in which the Director "adjudicat[es] contested
factual and legal issues between competing parties." (Respondent's Br., p. 26.) Therefore,
procedural deficiencies that occurred at the hearing should not be barred from being raised on
appeal simply because they were not raised at the administrative hearing.
The case relied upon by the Director to support his argument that this claim is
barred illustrates this point. (Respondent's Br., pp. 22-23.) In Mountainview Landowners Coop.
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Cool, the court declined to entertain a new issue on appeal because it was the

second appeal. 142 Idaho 861, 863, 865-66, 136 P.3d 332, 334, 336-37 (2006). In other words,
the appellants in that case had already appealed a district court decision once, and it was the
subsequent appeal of the remand during which the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district
court, in its appellate capacity, did not err in refusing to consider an issue that was not raised
during the first appeal. In this case, the issue was raised before the district court in the first
contested proceeding with opposing parties that could fully argue the issue. (R., Vol. 5,
pp. 820-21.) Therefore, this claim should not be barred.
Also, neither the Petition for Reconsideration nor the objection to the record
would have been a proper forum to raise this issue. A petition for reconsideration is exactly
that-a request for the Director to reconsider his decision. Thompson Creek would have no
reason to expect the Director to actually change his decision to create WDl 70 due to a
procedural deficiency at the hearing. Similarly, the objection to the record that Thompson Creek
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filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(j) is also irrelevant. Thompson Creek is
alleging that a procedural error occurred at the hearing itself when the Director did not go on the
record until after the question and answer session, not that the Department somehow erred in its
preparation of the transcript. Accordingly, this error could not have been corrected by the
Director, and raising it in the objection to the record would have been fruitless.

VI.
THE DIRECTOR HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE STRUCTURE OF WD170
In its initial brief, Thompson Creek argues that the structure ofWDl 70
established by the Director violates the water district statutes in Title 42, Chapter 6 of the Idaho
Code. (Appellant's Br., pp. 41-43.) One of the arguments specifically asserted by Thompson
Creek is that thereis no authority in the water district statutes for the conversion of three preexisting water districts in Basin 72 into "sub-districts." (Appellant's Br., pp. 41-43.)
In response, the Director argues that the creation of "sub-districts" is "within the
discretionary authority of the Director under Idaho Code§ 42-604." (Respondent's Br., p. 30.)
The Director also states that, "[t]he Court should recognize that in exercising his statutory
responsibility for the creation of water districts, the oversight of water district operations and the
supervision of waterrnasters, the Director has the discretion under Section 42-604 to combine
water districts through the use of sub-districts .... " (Respondent's Br., p. 31.)
Unfortunately, the Director does not cite any legal authority for his claim that the
creation of"sub-districts" is within his discretion. As Thompson Creek has explained, this Court
has free review over the construction and interpretation of statutes, even when such statutes
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relate to an agency's area of expertise. See, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist., 141 Idaho at 398,
111 P.3d at 83. Also, the Director only has those authorities that have been specifically granted
to him by the Idaho Legislature. See, e.g., Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514,915
P.2d 1371, 1372 (1996); Simpson v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212,998 P.2d 1122,
1125 (2000).
There is simply no authority for "sub-districts" in the water district statutes. As
Thompson Creek has explained, the authority to "combine" water districts in Section 42-604 is
inadequate because it simply allows two or more previously existing water districts to be
combined into one water district. This is different than the two-tiered,«umbrella district" and
"sub-dishict" structure established by the Director for WDl 70. 4

VII.
THE DIRECTOR INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THOMPSON CREEK
CLAIMS TO BE EXEMPT FROM WATER DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

In his response brief, the Director asserts that Thompson Creek believes it "should
be relieved of the state law requirement that its water rights be subject to a water district formed
under l.C. § 42-604 .... " (Respondent's Br., p. 31.) This is in response to Section V.D of
Thompson Creek's initial brief, in which Thompson Creek asserts that it should be excluded

4

In light of the Director's argument that he did not inappropriately rely on the W&SR
Agreement, it is noteworthy that the W &SR Agreement explicitly refers to the creation of
sub-districts. (R., Vol. 4, p. 715) ("Existing water districts within the basins will be converted to
subdistricts within the [Upper Salmon River Water District] as appropriate to facilitate
management."). It is certainly beyond coincidence that the Director accordingly created
sub-districts in WD 170 despite the absence of any legal authority. This further demonstrates
improper reliance on the W &SR Agreement.
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from WDI 70 to the extent that it is based upon the W&SR Agreement. (Appellant's Br.,
pp. 39-41.) The Director misunderstands Thompson Creek's argument on this point.
Thompson Creek argues as follows: First, Thompson Creek does not believe
there is "substantial evidence on the record as a whole" that WD 170 is "required in order to
properly administer uses of the water resource," as required by Idaho Code Sections 42-604
and 67-5279. (Appellant's Br., pp. 23-39.) Assuming this to be true, one could still argue that
the creation ofWDI 70 was appropriate based upon the requirements in the W&SR Agreement
for the creation of an Upper Salmon River Water District. To address this potential argument,
Thompson Creek in its initial brief simply points out that it was not a party to that Agreement
and, therefore, that its water rights could not be subject to the administration of a water district
that is formed solely on the basis of the W&SR Agreement. (Appellant's Br., pp. 39-40
(emphasis added).) As the Director concedes, that Agreement only binds the signatory parties.
(Respondent's Br., p. 14.)
Thompson Creek freely admits that its water rights would be subject to the
administration of a water district properly formed in accordance with the water district statutes
and the Idaho AP A. However, if the only basis supporting the formation of a water district is an
agreement not signed by Thompson Creek, then Thompson Creek would not be subject to the
administration of the district under those circumstances. Section D of the "Argument" section of
the Director's response brief misses this point entirely. (Respondent's Br., pp. 31-33.)
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VIII.
THE DIRECTOR'S ASSERTION THAT WD170 DOES NOT PREJUDICE
SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS OF THOMPSON CREEK IGNORES BOTH
THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF WATER DISTRICTS
Under the Idaho AP A, "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced." LC.§ 67-5279(4). In its initial brief, Thompson Creek
explains that the creation ofWDI 70 will result in the imposition of additional costs and the
potential curtailment of water deliveries if those costs are not paid. (Appellant's Br.,
pp. 2-3, 35, 38.) Moreover, Thompson Creek explains that, under Idaho law, water rights are
property rights entitled to Due Process protection. (Appellant's Br., p. 13.)
The Director's response argues that the creation ofWDI 70 does not prejudice the
substantial interests of Thompson Creek. (Respondent's Br., pp. 28-29.) If adversely affecting
financial interests and real property rights does not qualify as prejudicing substantial interests,
then the Idaho APA would be eviscerated. For example, the Idaho AP A could not be used to
appeal land use decisions, which deal nearly exclusively with the financial interests and real
property rights of the applicants and surrounding land owners.
Thompson Creek does not argue, as the Director implies, that "its water rights
obtained under state law are not subject to regulation in accordance with state law."
(Respondent's Br., pp. 28-29.) They are. Thompson Creek is simply explaining how the
creation ofWDl 70 prejudices Thompson Creek's interests, as required by the Idaho APA. This
is not the same as arguing that Thompson Creek's water rights "are not subject to regulation."
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The Director also asserts that, "Thompson Creek has participated fully during
each stage of the proceedings for the creation of WD 170" to support its arguments that
Thompson Creek's substantial rights have not been prejudiced. (Respondent's Br., p. 29.) This
is an irrelevant non sequitur. The fact that Thompson Creek has consistently expressed its
opposition to the creation ofWDl 70 in no way means that the creation ofWDl 70 does not
prejudice substantial interests of Thompson Creek. It is precisely because its interests are
prejudiced that Thompson Creek has "participated fully" in the process. Simply put, the
Director's argument that the creation ofWDl 70 does not prejudice substantial interests of
Thompson Creek ignores the legal and practical effects of water districts, and therefore has no
merit.
IX.
CONCLUSION

Paragraph 2 of Idaho Code Section 42-604 specifically states that a new water
district must be "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." The
Director is attempting to read this language out of the statute by claiming that paragraph 1
mandates the creation of water districts. This would render multiple provisions within
Section 42-604 "mere surplusage," in contravention of well-established rules of statutory
construction. Thompson Creek, by contrast, notes that paragraph 1 only requires the Director to
"divide" the state into water districts, and suggests that paragraph 2 modifies, i.e., provides
additional detail regarding, any preceding provisions related to the creation of water districts.
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This is the preferred construction of Section 42-604 because it does not render any of its
provisions "mere surplusage."
The Director asserts that the creation ofWDI 70 is supported by "substantial
evidence on the record" by referring to the previous order of interim administration, Conclusion
of Law 8 in the WD170 Order, and certain language in the Luke Affidavit. However, as
Thompson Creek has explained, all of the factual statements relied upon by the Director are
either not relevant or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The Director argues that Thompson Creek's claim that the Director was a biased
decision-maker is barred because it is being raised for this first time on appeal. However, this
claim is incorrect, because Thompson Creek did argue during the administrative proceedings that
the W&SR Agreement was an improper basis for forming WD170. This is the basis of its
"decision-maker bias" argument and was therefore sufficient to preserve that claim for appeal.
The Director attempts to justify the failure to record the entire hearing regarding
the creation ofWDl 70 by characterizing the unrecorded portion as an "informal question and
answer session." By the Director's admission, however, that question and answer session dealt
directly with the motivations behind the creation of WD 170, and it began at the time designated
for the public hearing. It was, therefore, part of the hearing as a matter of law and should have
been recorded. The Director also argues that this claim is barred because it is being raised for
the first time on appeal. However, the District Court proceeding on this appeal was the first
contested proceeding with parties that could argue the issue. And, it was an error that Thompson
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Creek did not discover until it was able to review the transcript and record together in detail.
This claim, therefore, should not be barred.
The Director attempts to justify his conversion of three pre-existing water dist1icts
into "sub-districts" within WDl 70 by asserting that it is within his discretion to do so. However,
he does not provide any legal support for his assertion. Simply put, administrative agencies may
not act in excess of their statutory authority, and there is simply no authority in the water district
statutes for the creation of"sub-districts."
The Director claims Thompson Creek is arguing that its water rights are somehow
exempt from water district administration. This is not true. Instead, Thompson Creek argues
that it should not be subject to administration by WDl 70 so long as the only basis for creating
that district is the W &SR Agreement, since Thompson Creek is not a party to that agreement.
By itself, the W &SR Agreement is not a proper basis for creating WD 170, because it does not
establish a need for water right administration, and because, as Thompson Creek's initial brief
explains, the order approving that Agreement restricts its use in subsequent proceedings.
The Director claims that Thompson Creek does not have substantial interests that
have been prejudiced by the creation ofWDI 70. This argument blatantly ignores the fact that
water rights are real property rights, that WD 170 will result in the imposition of significant costs
upon Thompson Creek, and that Thompson Creek's water deliveries may be shut off for nonpayment of those costs. These effects on Thompson Creek's financial well-being and real
property rights certainly qualify as "substantial interests" that are being prejudiced by the
creation ofWDl 70.
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Because the Director has committed error under the Idaho AP A, his order creating
WD 170 should be reversed.
DATED this

$+

__,2L day ofNovember, 2008.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
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